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Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership

Enron and the Dark Side
of Worker Ownership
David Millon1
Enron Corporation, once an exemplar of growth through innovation, now
epitomizes a range of ailments afflicting corporate America. These include
executive greed of obscene magnitude, deceitful earnings management and
accounting tactics, woefully inattentive board oversight, ineffective disclosure requirements, and flaccid auditing practices.2
One area of special concern is the catastrophic effect of Enron’s collapse
on the retirement security of its lower-level employees. As Congress considers a range of possible reforms, one aspect of this disaster has not
received much attention. The Enron 401(k) retirement plan, heavily and therefore fatally invested in Enron’s own stock, was a vehicle for workers to
participate in ownership of the business. Advocates on both ends of the
political spectrum have promoted worker ownership for many years, for ideological as well as efficiency-based reasons. In this essay, I recall some of the
arguments that have been advanced in support of increased opportunities for
worker ownership in this country. I then caution that the Enron debacle reveals
worker ownership’s dark side in the publicly held corporation context.

WORKER OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA
Investor ownership dominates the American business landscape, but
advocates of worker ownership can point to some notable exceptions. Many
small-scale artisanal and other kinds of firms are organized as worker-owned
cooperatives. The plywood manufacturing co-ops of the Pacific Northwest
are a notable example.3 Worker ownership also prevails in many professional service industries, including law, accounting, investment banking,
architecture, medicine, and others. Although recent legal developments
encourage rejection of the traditional partnership form of organization in these
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industries, limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships
continue to be owned by their principals rather than by outside investors.
Through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), workers own shares
in thousands of small and large business corporations in a broad range of
industries. ESOPs are employee benefit plans funded by employer contributions of the company’s own stock. Through its ESOP, United Airlines is
the largest majority employee-owned company in the world, but 2,500 of the
over 11,500 companies that have ESOPs in place are wholly or majority owned
by their employees.4
Although not typically thought of in these terms, an increasingly important vehicle for worker ownership is the 401(k) retirement plan. These are
defined-contribution plans. As such, they depend on employee contributions, typically supplemented by matching contributions from the employer.
The employee usually is allowed to determine the allocation of his or her
contribution among a number of investment options. Typically, the employer
matches some percentage of the employee’s contribution, with the match
taking various forms depending on the plan. The employee’s income tax
liability is deferred as to his or her contributions, while the employer’s
contributions generate immediate tax benefits.
Retirement benefits under defined-contribution plans depend on the
amounts contributed to the employee’s individual account by the employee
and employer and the performance of the assets in which those contributions
are invested. The employee bears the risk that these investments may produce insufficient retirement resources. In contrast, defined-benefit plans
require the employer to assume responsibility for funding the employee’s
post-retirement pension, typically calculated as a percentage of preretirement salary. The employer therefore bears the risk that it could be
unable to meet these obligations.5
The most common type of defined-contribution plan is the 401(k). An
estimated 42 million Americans participate in 401(k) plans, which hold a
total of $1.8 trillion in assets.6 Defined-contribution plans have replaced
defined-benefit plans as the more common type of retirement program. As
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of 1999, 42% of the private sector labor force participated in definedcontribution plans while only 25% participated in defined-benefit plans.7
The 401(k) plan facilitates worker ownership because ERISA allows
individual accounts to invest in company stock. While individual plans vary,
most allow employees to allocate their contributions entirely to the purchase
of company stock. 8 Many also provide that the employer’s matching
contribution must be entirely in the form of its own stock. Over 11 million
workers participate in 401(k) plans that hold company stock.9 While ERISA
limits company stock to 10% of the assets held by defined-benefit plans, no
such limit applies to 401(k) plans in which the employee makes the investment decisions.10 The average amount of company stock in 401(k) plans
holding such stock is approximately 30% of total asset value,11 but plans
at many large corporations hold far more. Concentrations of greater than
60% are not unusual12 and company stock holdings at some plans are as high
as 95%.13 As these data indicate, the spread of defined-contribution retirement plans is turning thousands of workers into owners of their corporate
employers.

BENEFITS OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
Proponents of worker ownership point to a number of justifications. While
some of these ideas depend on non-instrumental notions of human dignity,
advocates also base their arguments on the beneficial consequences of worker
ownership.
One set of arguments emerges from the critique of capitalism and emphasizes the elimination of conflict between capital and labor. Integrating work
and ownership can make it possible for decisions about compensation and
the organization and pace of work to be made in a non-adversarial manner.
Control over work by the workers themselves promises to reduce exploitation and alienation and promote the possibility of self-actualization
through work.14
A different ideological agenda justifies worker ownership by reference to
notions of democratic self-governance. By transferring control from outside
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investors to the workers themselves, worker ownership can facilitate
democratization of decision-making within the workplace. In this regard,
the values of “liberty and popular sovereignty” can be just as relevant to the
economic context as they are assumed to be in the political arena.15 While
self-governance may be defended as a good in itself, positive psychological
consequences can include the sense of satisfaction that can come from being
“one’s own boss.” In this regard, participation in workplace self-governance
can also provide training for active involvement in a democratic society’s
political processes.16
Efficiency benefits are also asserted. Although data are not entirely conclusive, worker ownership appears to increase firm productivity in many
cases.17 Ownership can bring about higher worker effort levels through
greater organizational commitment, motivation, and sense of being “part of
a team.” Enhanced job satisfaction can increase worker morale, which in
turn can favorably influence job performance. Because ownership gives
workers a direct stake in the benefits of their own increased output, they
know that they, rather than outside investors, will reap the fruits of
their efforts.
A further efficiency benefit is the reduction of the costs of monitoring
worker performance.18 Investor-owners face the challenge of ensuring that
workers put forth sufficient effort. When workers are owners, as a group
they bear the costs of low effort and therefore have an incentive to optimize
their own effort levels. Although individual workers may still be inclined to
shirk (because the individual enjoys the full benefit of leisure but bears only
a fraction of the cost), they will have strong incentives to monitor each other’s
activities and are likely to be able to do so more efficiently than nonemployee investors acting through agents.
For the small-scale firm, an identity between ownership and management
can enhance efficiency by reducing agency costs. To the extent owners are
directly involved in management, their active self-interest should yield
better decision-making than is likely to obtain under management by nonowner outsiders.19 Costs that otherwise would be involved in attempting to
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ensure managerial accountability, either through enforcement of legal rules
or through financial efforts to align the interests of non-owner managers with
those of owners, are reduced or eliminated.
For larger-scale enterprises, in which share ownership is broadly dispersed
among large numbers of workers—and often outside investors as well—
worker ownership typically does not result in direct participation in
management. Worker-owners must rely on agents to manage the firm in
their interest and therefore face the same agency cost problem that investorowners confront as a result of the separation between ownership and control.
Nevertheless, even in large corporations worker ownership can reduce the
costs of reliance on agents.20 By virtue of firm-specific human capital
investments and relatively limited exit options, workers have stronger incentives than outside investors to insist on management accountability. As a
practical matter, they may be better positioned to act cooperatively to maximize their voting power in comparison to dispersed investor-owners facing
significant collective action costs. Employees, being present, may also have
better access to information about their agents’ performance.

WORKER OWNERSHIP’S DARK SIDE
While support for worker ownership comes both from political
progressives and from hard-nosed proponents of efficiency, Enron’s recent
collapse should remind everyone that there is a dark side to worker ownership. Under Enron’s 401(k) plan, employees could contribute up to 15% of
salary (subject to a ceiling) to their individual accounts. Employees could
allocate their contributions entirely to Enron stock or could choose from
among a number of well-diversified mutual funds.21 At the urging of Chief
Executive Officer Ken Lay, lower-level Enron employees invested huge
amounts of their 401(k) retirement savings in Enron stock.22 Enron’s matching contributions were made entirely in Enron stock. That fact may itself
have further encouraged employees to invest their contributions in company
stock rather than in one or more of the other available investment vehicles.23
While shares attributable to the employees’ own contributions could be real-
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located, the matching shares could not be sold until the account holders
reached the age of 50.
As of January 2001, close to two-thirds of the assets held by the Enron
401(k) plan consisted of Enron’s own common stock.24 Many employees
held even higher percentages in their individual accounts. The benefits to
Enron were substantial. By funding its employees’ retirement with its
own stock, Enron was able to compensate its workers with a non-cash
currency that—unknown to them—appeared to be far more valuable than it
really was.25 In the process, Enron’s use of this overvalued currency for its
401(k) and ESOP contributions allowed it to purchase massive tax benefits
at bargain prices.
For Enron’s employees, the high levels of company stock in their retirement accounts were disastrous. When Enron’s stock price collapsed—
falling from a high of nearly $90 per share in 2000 to its current price of
about $.25—employees lost up to 99% of the value of their retirement
accounts. Fifteen thousand employees have seen the value of the company’s
401(k) plan decline by $1.3 billion since Enron’s high water mark.26 An
administrative assistant named Deborah Perrotta, for example, lost not only
her job but also $40,000 in retirement savings.27 Many others lost far more.28
Prior to the crash, legal restrictions would have prevented employees from
selling their ESOP and employer-match 401(k) shares in any event. However, the 401(k) Enron shares attributable to their own contributions that could
otherwise have been reallocated to other investments were frozen during a
crucial period—from October 29 to November 12, 2001—while a new plan
administrator was assuming control. Even without the lockdown, however,
these assets might as well have been illiquid because workers were unaware
of the full extent of Enron’s precarious financial condition. On October 16,
the company had already made an unanticipated announcement of a $618
million third-quarter loss (and $1.2 billion reduction in shareholders’ equity),
but during the lockdown period Enron executives must have been planning
for the Chapter 11 filing, which was made on December 2.
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Of course, Enron’s senior management labored under no such disabilities
and behaved accordingly. Lay, while encouraging workers to keep buying
Enron stock,29 sold $16 million worth of shares back to the company during
August 2001 and kept on selling through October 26, the eve of the
lockdown.30 On September 24, Lay told employees that Enron stock was a
great bargain, but didn’t bother to mention that he himself had sold $20 million worth during the previous six weeks.31 Lay had already made a $20.7
million profit through exercise of Enron stock options earlier in the year.32
The extreme lack of diversification that characterized Enron’s 401(k)
retirement plan, though legal,33 obviously played a huge role in the hardship
that has fallen upon its rank-and-file employees. The fundamental premise
of modern financial economics is the importance of a diversified investment
portfolio as a safeguard against industry-wide and firm-specific risk.34 Generally speaking, as investors broaden their portfolios to include a range of
stocks, they can reduce their risk to a level approaching that of the market as
a whole. In contrast, by “putting all their eggs in one basket,” Enron’s
employees were entirely at the mercy of that company’s fortunes.
Unfortunately, the fate of Enron’s employees is not unique. Several large
corporations’ 401(k) plans heavily funded with company stock have suffered
similar losses, including Nortel Networks, Lucent Technologies, and Global
Crossing Ltd.35 Even greater disasters are possible: Over 80% of the securities held by retirement plans at Abbott Laboratories, Anheuser-Busch, BB&T,
Coca-Cola, Pfizer, and Sherwin-Williams consist of the company’s own stock;
at Procter & Gamble the figure is nearly 95%.36 Even if the risk of complete
failure at these companies is remote, no single company’s future can be predicted with certainty. Employees’ retirement security at these companies is
even more closely linked to the firm’s future than it was at Enron and therefore far more risky than is necessary.
Plans like Enron’s and those just mentioned provide a vehicle through
which workers can participate in ownership of their employer. As such, they
may provide many of the benefits touted by advocates of worker ownership.
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Even so, Enron should make clear beyond doubt that those benefits can come
at a great cost.

LESSONS FROM ENRON
Diversification
The huge losses suffered by workers at Enron and at other corporations
whose now worthless retirement plans were heavily invested in company
stock could have been avoided by diversification. This point is obvious, but
it is made even more urgent by the additional risk that workers face due to
the fact that their investments of human capital are unavoidably undiversified.
Many jobs require workers to obtain special training, assimilate into a unique
fabric of co-workers, and acquire knowledge about a particular company’s
culture. Because job requirements and work environments differ in important ways, workers cannot readily transfer these kinds of investment to a
new employer. Their value is largely firm-specific, so, if the company fails,
the employee loses not only any financial capital invested in the employer’s
stock but also his or her human capital investment. While diversification is
not an option with regard to human capital investments (because people work
at one job at a time), certainly the risk presented by this phenomenon should
make financial diversification all the more urgent.
Several proposals now before Congress would address the diversification
concern in various ways. One bill would limit company stock to 20% of the
market value of an employee’s 401(k) account.37 Another would restrict
company stock to 10% of the part of the individual’s account attributable to
his or her contributions.38 The need for reform of this kind would seem to be
obvious, but the Bush Administration’s current proposal ignores this aspect
of the diversification problem.39 Business groups do not want to prevent
employers from matching employee contributions with company stock,
presumably because it’s cheaper than using cash.40 In addition, some
supporters of the president’s proposal apparently recognize the incentive
effects that can flow from worker ownership.41
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Mandatory diversification would also restrict employees’ freedom of
choice, but that argument should carry no weight in this context.42 Lowerwage employees often lack investment sophistication and therefore are
especially prone to misunderstand the risk inherent in an undiversified
retirement portfolio. They are actually more likely than higher-wage
employees to over-invest in company stock,43 even though lower-wage
employees typically are much more dependent on their 401(k) plans for
retirement security. Further, it is not just the employees themselves who
bear the consequences of bad investment choices. Ultimately, the costs of
inadequate retirement resources fall on society at large, to be assumed by
private or public agencies.
In the larger context of debates over the benefits of worker ownership,
legislatively mandated diversification would sharply curtail the use of the
defined-contribution retirement plan as a vehicle for promotion of worker
ownership. 401(k) plans are widely available, convenient, tax-advantageous,
and subsidized by employers. As such, they are probably the easiest route to
ownership for workers employed by large, public corporations. Diversification requirements would come at the cost of loss of this opportunity and the
human dignity values and productivity gains that can flow from it. Even so,
in light of the disastrous consequences of 401(k) investment in company stock
at Enron and elsewhere, one can only hope that the momentum behind
legislatively imposed diversification requirements is strong enough to
override the president’s position and the traditional arguments in favor of
worker ownership.
Control
Enron should remind worker ownership proponents of the dangers posed
by ownership without control. While lower-level workers were committing
their retirement assets to Enron’s apparently bright future, management was
engaged in elaborate financial shell games, deceitful accounting practices,
and increasingly risky projects, all designed to maintain earnings growth at
all costs. Enron’s obsession with quarterly earnings targets and short-term
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stock prices is typical of the approach taken by most corporate managers
nowadays.44 Enron is not the first company to fall victim to this way of
doing business. So far, though, it is the largest.
Non-employee investors have long understood that the value of their
investments depends on management decision-making over which they have
no real control. Corporate law and market forces exert some amount of pressure on management to perform effectively and responsibly, and equity-based
compensation may align its interests with those of investors to a certain
extent. But no one believes that these mechanisms are sufficient to ensure
management accountability to shareholder interests. Although shareholders
elect directors annually, except in unusual cases the vote is nothing but
an endorsement of selections made by the CEO. There is and has been for
many years a wide separation between ownership and control of our
largest corporations.
The position of worker-owners in relation to management is not significantly different from that of outside investors. Many of the democratic values
that are supposed to flow from worker ownership simply do not obtain in the
public company setting. Self-governance is likely to be limited to the worker’s
immediate working environment if it is present at all. If it is present, it is
typically based on management’s commitment to new forms of work organization rather than on the fact that the workers own stock in the business.
Since worker-owners almost never hold a majority or even a substantial
minority voting interest in a corporation’s stock through their 401(k) plans,
control at the top level through election of representatives to the board
simply does not occur.45 Workers, even more than investor-owners, are at
the mercy of management decisions over which they have no control.
Stock ownership may cause workers to feel more committed to their
employers and heightened motivation may translate into higher productivity.
Ownership should also result in a more equitable distribution of gains resulting from increased efficiency. Even so, Enron warns us that worker-owners
are no less vulnerable than non-owners to the costs of corrupt, irresponsible,
or incompetent managers. Ownership without control really amounts to little
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more than a profit-sharing arrangement. The benefits to workers, whether
political or financial, may not come close to offsetting their extreme vulnerability to bad decisions made by other people.
Information
Enron should also remind advocates of worker ownership of the risks
involved in holding company stock in the absence of adequate information
about the company’s prospects. Federal securities laws mandate extensive
disclosure requirements. As shareholders, Enron’s employees had access to
this information. Unfortunately, this proved to be of very limited value
because Enron’s accounting practices and public statements were designed
to do whatever was necessary to encourage continued confidence in Enron
stock. Employees were therefore just as ignorant as Enron’s investorowners and the creditors and professional analysts who failed to see what
was coming.46 Only Enron’s executives understood the company’s precarious, house-of-cards condition. As we have seen, they managed to sell
millions of shares before the collapse.47
Federal securities laws were insufficient to protect Enron’s workerowners, just as they failed to protect its other non-insider investors. While
worker ownership in smaller-scale businesses may provide workers with
important information about a company’s financial condition, in the public
corporation context share ownership may do very little to improve the informational disparity between management and workers. Under these circumstances, ownership is a very risky proposition. Outside investors can reduce
the risk through diversification, but undiversified employee-owners like those
at Enron stand to lose all of their savings. The informational handicap
inherent in the ownership of public corporation stock is a further reason to
question the value of worker ownership in that arena.

CONCLUSION
Worker ownership has drawn support from both ends of the political spectrum. It has been defended on ideological, human dignity grounds, and it
has been said to enhance individual psychological well-being as well as
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productive efficiency. Enron should provide an unmistakable warning of the
serious dangers inherent in using retirement plans to promote worker ownership in the public corporation. To the extent that workers’ financial investments in their companies are undiversified, they place their retirement
security at serious risk, thereby magnifying the risk they already face as
undiversified investors of their own human capital. Stock ownership in the
public corporation context typically does not bring with it the opportunity to
participate in control over the business’ future. Nor does it necessarily provide access to essential information about risk. Worker-owners therefore
find not only their job security but also their financial future at the mercy of
people who may be unworthy of their trust. Despite worker ownership’s
many potential benefits in small business, the professions, and elsewhere,
claims about its value in the public corporation context deserve skepticism
of the highest degree.
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